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IS ANYONE REGULATING? THE CURIOUS STATE OF
GMO GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Rebecca M. Bratspies*†
INTRODUCTION
The promise of biotechnology has been tantalizingly just beyond reach
for a number of years.1
Conventional wisdom suggests that biotechnology may hold enormous
promise for increasing agricultural production, improving sustainability,
and offering more nutritious food to the public. Promises of increased
yield2—more food for a hungry world3 and more profit for struggling
farmers4—are dangled alongside claims that biotechnology crops result in
decreased pesticide use5 and lower environmental impacts.6 Taken together,
these claims buttress the oft-repeated assertion that agricultural
biotechnology is a critical tool for improving human well-being. From this
vantage point, it is relatively easy to caricature opponents of the technology
as modern day Luddites7—or worse, unthinking elitists willing to sacrifice
* Professor CUNY School of Law, Director CUNY Center for Urban Environmental Reform.
Professor Bratspies earned her B.A. in biology from Wesleyan University, and her J.D., cum laude, from
the Univeristy of Pennsylvania. This paper benefitted from discussions at the University of Minnesota
IGERT Symposium on GMO Governance in the United States, and the Vermont Law School
Symposium on Agriculture and Food Systems.
† I am particularly grateful to Greg Jaffe of the Center for Science in the Public Interest,
Sheila Jasanoff of the Harvard Kennedy School, and Marti Mellon of the Union of Concerned Scientists
for valuable feedback.
1. Ismail Serageldin, Speech: Agriculture's Role in Sustainable Human Development: An
Action Agenda for the New Millennium, http://www.serageldin.com/SpeechDetail.aspx?SID=
g406tiDW2qmQ48TrjbViAw%3D%3D (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
2. Do GM Crops Increase Yields, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/
do-gm-crops-increase-yield.aspx. (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
3. See, e.g., Maggie Urry, Genetic products row worsens, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 20, 1997, 4
(quoting former USDA Secretary Dan Glickman for the proposition that “[g]rowing pest-resistant crops
would alleviate world hunger, reduce pesticide damage to the environment, and save rain forests from
being cleared for food production”).
4. Graham Brooks & Peter Barfoot, GM Crops: global socio-economic and environmental
impacts 1996–2010, 32–34, 80–82 (May 2012), http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/page/33/global-impact2012.
5. Id.; See also Biotechnology, MONSANTO, http://www.monsantoafrica.com/biotechnology/
default.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (asserting that “other innovations” can contribute to decreased
use of pesticides).
6. Brooks and Barfoot, supra note 4, at 83–88.
7. See Biofortified rice as a contribution to the alleviation of life-threatening micronutrient
deficiencies in developing countries, THE GOLDEN RICE PROJECT, http://www.goldenrice.org/index.php
(last visited Apr. 25, 2013) (“The shocking fact is that . . . more than 10 million children under the age
of five are dying every year. A high proportion of those children die victim of common diseases that
could be prevented through a better nutrition. This number has been equated with a ‘Nutritional
Holocaust.’ It is unfortunate that the world is not embracing more readily a number of approaches with
the potential to substantially reduce the number of deaths. It has been calculated that the life of 25
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the hungry masses rather than confront their fears of science and change.8
And indeed, those charges are an integral part of the public discussion of
agricultural biotechnology—sometimes made explicit, other times sub rosa.
Had biotech crops unambiguously delivered on its promoters’
extravagant promises, this indictment would indeed be a serious one.
However, after nearly two decades of experience with these crops, it is not
altogether clear that these claims are valid. Despite overwhelming adoption
of genetically engineered (GE) corn, soybeans, and cotton, crop yields have
largely held steady or decreased,9 while pesticide use has skyrocketed.10 As
a result, at least ten species of so-called “superweeds”—weed plants
resistant to glyphosate—have been documented in more than twenty
states.11 Worse, the problem of food insecurity has increased rather than
decreased—leaving more people hungry than at any other point in human
history.12 Many policymakers nevertheless insist that biotech crops are the
future of global agriculture, and that these crops will ultimately deliver on
the promises made from the very beginning.13
percent of those children could be spared by providing them with diets that included crops biofortified
with provitamin A (beta-carotene) and zinc”).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE 1 (2008) (arguing that while it costs
rich countries nothing to drive out biotechnology through regulation, driving out biotechnology from
poor countries impacts their farm-production and food-consumption needs). Norman Borlaug, Nobel
Laureate and “Father” of Green Revolution, was widely quoted as characterizing biotechnology
opponents as “[e]xtremists in the environmental movement, largely from rich nations . . . [that] seem to
be doing everything they can to stop scientific progress in its tracks.” Norman E. Borlaug, Ending World
Hunger. The Promise of Biotechnology and the Threat of Antiscience Zealotry, 124 PLANT PHYSIOL.
487, 488 (2000), available at http://www.plantphysiol.org/content/124/2/487.full.
9. DOUG CURIAN-SHERMAN, Failure to Yield: Evaluating the Performance of Genetically
Engineered
Crops,
UNION
OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS
,13
(Apr.
2009),
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/failure-to-yield.pdf; B.L. Ma & K. D.
Subedi, Development, yield, grain moisture and nitrogen uptake of Bt corn hybrids and their
CROPS
RESS
199,
200,
209
(2005),
conventional
near-isolines,
93
FIELD
http://www.saveourseeds.org/downloads/Btmaize_inferior_yield.pdf.
10. See Charles Benbrook, Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use in the
US—the First Sixteen Years, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES EUROPE, 24:24, at 1 (Sept. 2012),
http://www.enveurope.com/content/pdf/2190-4715-24-24.pdf (finding that pesticide use has increased
by approximately 404 million pounds or 7 percent).
11. William Newman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope With Roundup Resistant Weeds, N.Y.
TIMES, BI, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energyenvironment/04weed.html?pagewanted=print. Indeed, Bayer Cropscience’s most pitch for its genetically
engineered cotton begins with the following phrase: “With weed resistance exploding across America’s
farmland.” Bayer CropScience, Stoneville Offers Two New Varieties With GlyTol and LibertyLink
Traits, (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.bayercropscience.us/news/product-news?storyId=0CB58C47-BE794A2C-9979-162CE57A055D.
12. Rebecca Bratspies, Food, Technology and Hunger, 8 LAW CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 1, 7
(Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://lch.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/24/1743872112456990.
13. For example, Ismail Serageldin CGIAR Chief and World Bank Vice-President
characterized biotechnology as “a crucial part of expanding agricultural productivity in the 21st
century.” While he viewed biotechnology as “a tremendous help in meeting the challenge of feeding an
additional three billion human beings, 95% of them in the poor developing countries, on the same
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Even assuming for purposes of discussion that agricultural
biotechnology can ultimately be able to live up to a portion of its
extravagant billing, these public advantages will only be realized with a
comprehensive and scientifically rigorous regulatory system that ensures
environmental and human health issues are addressed in a transparent and
credible fashion. To our detriment, we currently do not have such a system.
As a result the United States is in the process of reaping a harvest of
environmental harms associated with uncontrolled planting of GE crops,
including: contamination of conventional and organic crops; an explosion
of herbicide-resistant weeds; and a massive overall increase in herbicide
use. The impact of these broad-based concerns, and the lack of regulatory
attention they attract ought to give one pause when considering how
thoroughly these crops are regulated.
The companies involved in developing and marketing transgenic
agricultural crops take the position that regulation is stringent and
omnipresent in their industry. For example, Aventis CropScience claimed
that “[a]ll of our products, including those based on biotechnology, undergo
thorough human, animal, and environmental safety evaluations. In order to
be released commercially, they have to obtain the respective regulatory
authorization. This involves rigorous governmental safety reviews and
approval processes.”14 The assertion that “[e]xtensive testing and a long
approval process accompany every GM crop introduction”15 is routinely
offered as an antidote to doubt about the wisdom of approving these crops,
as is the proposition that “[i]n the United States, three agencies regulate
these crops.”16 The agencies are not far behind. The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) claims to employ “a science-based
regulatory system” that “allows for the safe development and use of
agricultural goods derived from new technologies that provide increased
production options to agricultural producers.”17 Indeed more than a decade

amount of land and water currently available,” he also recognized that for this to occur, the technology
must first be “safely deployed.”
14. Should We Grow GM Crops?, article to special report Harvest of Fear, PBS, quoted in PBS
Harvest of Fear, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/harvest/exist/no6.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Bayer now owns this portion of Aventis. Bayer: A History,
Gmwarh.org/gm-paper/11153-bayer-a-history.
15. Pocket K No. 11: Contribution of GM Technology to the Livestock Sector, INT’L SERV. FOR
THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/
pocketk/11/default.asp (last updated 2006); SAN DIEGO CTR. FOR MOLECULAR AGRIC., FOOD FROM
GENETICALLY
MODIFIED
CROPS
10,
http://www.brown.edu/ce/adult/arise/resources/docs/
gmfoodbrochure.pdf.
16. SAN DIEGO CTR. FOR MOLECULAR AGRIC., supra note 15, at 4.
17. USDA, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2015 23, http://www.ocfo.usda.gov/usdasp/sp2010/
sp2010.pdf.
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ago, former USDA Secretary Dan Glickman asserted, “[t]est after rigorous
scientific test has proven these products to be safe.”18
These claims of rigorous regulation are not borne out in practice. The
United States does not have a comprehensive regulatory scheme that
considers all of the likely risks associated with GE crops prior to approval
or, for that matter, on an on-going basis. Numerous reasons exist to bring
more rigorous regulatory scrutiny to GE organisms. This Article highlights
how, in the absence of such a regulatory scheme, critical risks associated
with these cracks escape regulatory scrutiny. The end result is that private
actors, motivated by short-term interests, are able to engage in conduct that
imposes risks on wider society without any democratic consideration of the
acceptability of those risks.19 To be clear, this is an indictment of the
decision-making process itself rather than a comment about particular
regulatory outcomes. The objection is not so much to the exact contours of
the ultimate decisions about these crops, but to the lack of democratic
legitimacy in a regulatory structure that systematically transfers the power
to make what should be public decisions—involving public participation
and based on public interests—to private actors, motivated by private
interests. Long experience has shown that in the absence of a transparent
regulatory process, which forces a public weighing of costs and benefits,
such private risk-benefit analyses too often disregard important public
values and interests. Thus, this Article focuses on the kind of regulatory
system necessary for appropriate decision-making and the kind of system
that will build public confidence in biotechnology.
It is no secret that protecting the public’s interest in this context
requires the government to assume a far more active role than the hands-off
attitude that has been the hallmark of conventional agricultural policy. To
that end, this Article argues that the United States needs an effective
regulatory system for GE crops—one that is not only comprehensive and
scientifically rigorous, but also transparent and credible to the public it is
intended to protect and benefit. To make the case that we do not currently
have such a regulatory system, Section I of this Article begins with a brief
historical overview of how we arrived at this juncture in the first place—
identifying some key technological breakthroughs and regulatory decisions.
Section II then lays out the current United States regulatory system for
transgenic crops, detailing the patchwork of statutes and agencies pressed
into service. Section III highlights some key considerations that routinely
fall through the gaps in our current patchworked regulatory system. Section
18. Maggie Urry, supra note 3 (quotations omitted).
19. See Serageldin, supra note 1 (referencing this transition to private research and
decisionmaking).
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IV concludes with some thoughts on how this regulatory situation impacts
broader democratic legitimacy questions.
I.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

The United States current regulatory system for biotechnology dates
back to the Reagan Administration. It emerged not from careful, proactive
government decision making, but in response to a lawsuit brought against
the federal government over the first field trials of a genetically modified
organism. After Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA in
1953, molecular genetic research exploded. By the early 1970s, academic
researchers had developed the capacity to transfer genes from one organism
to another, and to create recombinant DNA molecules. The prospects for
this new technology were both exciting and frightening. Prompted by a
concern that the speed of technology’s advance had outpaced any controls,
one-hundred-fifty scientists from around the world gathered at the Asilomar
Conference Center in Pine Grove, California to hammer out a set of safety
precautions for genetic research.20 Known as the Asilomar Consensus
Statement,21 the conference recommended a series of guidelines for genetic
engineering research. This consensus formed the basis for the Recombinant
DNA Research Guidelines issued by the National Institute of Health (NIH)
in 1976.22
The first real challenge to these guidelines came soon afterwards. In
1983, a California company applied for permission to field test a GE
bacterium called “Ice-minus.”23 In its conventional, unmodified form, this
bacteria was responsible for causing frost damage to plants.24 A researcher
at University of California–Berkeley modified the bacteria so that it no
longer promoted the ice crystal formation that damages plants as frost.25
The idea was that by replacing the common bacteria with the GE “Iceminus” bacteria, plants would be better able to resist frost damage.26
20. For a discussion of the Asilomar Conference and its consequences, see Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 371, 378–79 (2004).
21. ASSEMBLY OF LIFE SCI., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE ASILOMAR
CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES (1975), http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQ/B/C/G/D/
/qqbcgd.pdf.
22. Charles Weiner, Is Self-Regulation Enough Today? Evaluating the Recombinant DNA
Controversy, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 289, 293–98 (1999) (providing history of Recombinant DNA selfregulation).
23. See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY & ALONZO PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
COMMUNCATING RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 75 (1988) (providing an account of the “Ice-minus”
controversy).
24. Id. at 78.
25. Id. at 77–78.
26. Id. at 75.
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After successful greenhouse testing, the developer applied for
permission to field-test the “Ice-minus” bacteria by spraying it on potato,
tomato, and bean plants.27 The NIH, which at the time was the only federal
agency exercising any regulatory authority over biotechnology, approved
the field trials through its Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee.28
Jeremy Rivkin and the Foundation on Economic Trends (FET) sued in
federal court, arguing that the NIH had violated the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) by approving the release without conducting an
Environmental Impact Assessment.29 In a landmark decision by Judge
Skelley Wright, the D.C. Circuit issued an injunction prohibiting NIH from
approving the field trial until it considered the “broad[er] environmental
issues attendant on deliberate release” of genetically modified organisms.30
Striking on themes that continue to haunt regulation of genetically modified
organisms, the court “emphatically” concluded that NIH had failed to
“display[] . . . rigorous attention to environmental concerns.”31 In particular,
the court found that NIH had completely failed to consider “the possibility
of various environmental effects”—identifying as the most “glaring
deficiency” NIH’s failure to consider the effects of dispersal of the
genetically modified organisms.32
This successful legal challenge forced the Reagan Administration to
develop a more overarching regulatory policy to guide federal decisionmaking about biotechnology research and its products. To that end, in 1984
the Office of Science and Technology Policy proposed the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, which was finalized in
27. Id. at 90–91.
28. Recombinant DNA Research; Actions Under Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548, 24,548–52.
(June 1, 1983).
29. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler (I), 587 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter
Heckler I], aff’d in part & vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For a detailed discussion of
this case, see Elizabeth Pizzulli, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler: Genetic Engineering and
NEPA’s EIS Requirement, 2 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 138, 138–139 (1984).
30. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler (II), 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
Heckler II]. At the time, very little was known about the ramifications of this technology. EPA had
already concluded that the Ice-minus bacteria would likely escape the test plot and persist indefinitely in
the environment. Indeed, in an unusually frank contemporaneous comment, a researcher commented
“You remember the space program, when all those rockets were blowing up on the launching pad? Well,
the science (of gene-splicing) is at that stage now." See Andrew Maykuth, Genetic Wonders to Come:
Some See Boon, Others Calamity, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 10, 1986), http://www.maykuth.com/Archives/
gene86.htm (quoting William R. Harvey, then a researcher at Temple University).
31. Heckler II, 756 F.2d at 146.
32. Id. at 153–54. After the Foundation on Economic Trends lawsuit, EPA reviewed and
ultimately approved the proposed “Ice-minus” field tests. Local protests continued to hinder the
experiments, as municipalities and citizens groups objected to having the test plots in their communities.
The company did not help its cause—during the pendency of the proceeding, they illegally applied
recombinant insects to trees on a rooftop patio at its Oakland headquarters. The field tests ultimately
took place in 1987 amidst a media storm.
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1986.33 From its inception, the Coordinated Framework’s drafters made it
clear that their primary goal was addressing industry needs for “sensible”
regulation that would not stifle innovation,34 rather than responding to a
public desire for rigorous regulation to protect public safety. Thus, the
resulting Coordinated Framework emphasized the United States’
commitment to reducing trade barriers in biotechnology.35 A comparable
degree of commitment to preserving environmental safety was less evident.
With virtually no modifications in the intervening decades, this
Coordinated Framework continues to govern regulatory decisions about
agricultural biotechnology. The central assumption guiding the Coordinated
Framework is “substantial equivalence,”36 which is the assessment that the
products of genetic engineering are functionally equivalent to their
unmodified counterparts and should be treated accordingly.37 This starting
point led the United States to develop a regulatory system built on four key
principles:
[1] biotechnology poses no unique risks; [2] the products of
biotechnology should be regulated, not the process; [3] existing
laws should be used to regulate the products of biotechnology (no
new legislation was needed); and [4] any gaps should be
33. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June
26,1986).
34. The proposal provided in relevant part:
The Working Group recognizes the need for a coordinated and sensible regulatory
review process that will minimize the uncertainties and inefficiencies that can
stifle innovation and impair the competitiveness of U.S. industry. . . . The
importance of addressing the emerging commercial aspects of biotechnology in a
coordinated and timely fashion is captured in the recent report by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment which warned: ‘Although the
United States is currently the world leader in both basic science and commercial
development of new biotechnology, continuation of the initial preeminence of
American companies in the commercialization of new biotechnology is not
assured.
Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,856, 50,857 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984). Indeed, responding to the political and economic
climate characterized by a general anxiety that the United States was losing its competitive
edge, the Reagan Administration sent a clear message that “regulatory agencies were not to
stand in the way of biotechnology.” Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty. Complexity
and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of First Generation Environmental Law, 33
ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 171 n. 328 (2006).
35. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,308.
36. See generally Jan-Peter Nap et al., The Release of Genetically Modified Crops into the
Environment, 33 PLANT J. 1, 9 (2003); See also Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 390
(discussing the problems that arise with the United States lack of a comprehensive statute addressing
genetically engineered products and the division of regulation among various agencies).
37. Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically
Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 406 (2007).
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addressed through coordination among agencies and designation
of lead agencies as appropriate.38

A key consequence of this approach is that the United States did not
adopt any new laws directly targeting regulation of this new technology.
That means there is no unified statutory authority for regulating these crops,
and no regulator with an unambiguous regulatory mandate. Instead of one
single federal agency charged with comprehensively governing the
regulation of GE crops, regulatory responsibility was spread across three
different federal agencies, with three very different mandates. These federal
agencies pressed into service a patchwork of statutes, all of which predated
the advent of this technology, in order to cobble together some kind of
regulatory system. The resulting system divides up regulatory authority in
ways that do not particularly make sense and leave some key risks
unregulated.
The three decades since the “Ice-Minus” debacle have seen a dramatic
growth of regulatory apparatuses and a dramatic increase in the agencies’
decision making about GE organisms. Yet, if we look at the questions that
still do not fit neatly into the regulatory process, we find that they are
precisely the same kinds of issues that prompted an injunction in 1983.
There are three categories of risk that this cobbled-together regulatory
scheme is particularly poor at addressing: systemic environmental risks,
food safety risks, and risks of social and economic disruption flowing from
unresolved liability and property issues.
II. THE AGENCIES AND THEIR REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Before turning to some recent disputes that highlight the regulatory
gaps identified above, it is worthwhile to first lay out the relative regulatory
roles the Coordinated Framework assigned to the USDA, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—
the main actors in this regulatory space.39 Thus, the next three subsections
offer a thumbnail sketch of the agencies and their primary roles under the
38. Id.
39. I have elsewhere explored these regulatory roles in some detail. Interested readers are
encouraged to seek out those earlier works. For an in-depth discussion of EPA’s role in regulating Bt
crops, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation: Uncertainty and Genetically Modified
Food Crops, 10 NYU ENVT’L L. J. 297, 314–16 (2002) (arguing that deficiencies exist in EPA’s
regulation due to statutory inadequacies); for information about FDA’s regulatory role, see Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark: How America’s First Transgenic Animal Escaped Regulation, 6 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 457, 471–72 (2005) (describing FDA’s failure to regulate transgenic fish); and for an
explanation of USDA-APHIS’s role, see Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 390 (discussing
the USDA’s authority to regulate genetically engineered organisms).
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Coordinated Framework. The short version is that the USDA, EPA, and
FDA divide up regulatory authority based on their pre-existing statutory
authorities. At least ten different laws and numerous agency regulations and
guidelines are pressed into service to regulate GE plants, animals, and
microorganisms. Each of these laws predates the advent of biotechnology,
and they reflect widely different regulatory approaches and procedures.
In theory, this division of labor means that the EPA evaluates whether
a GE plant is safe for the environment,40 the USDA evaluates whether the
plant is safe to grow,41 and the FDA evaluates whether the plant is safe to
eat.42 In practice, that distinction rapidly breaks down because of the
artificialities introduced by the need to rely on pre-existing statutory
authority. Statutes written well before the advent of genetic engineering do
not map perfectly onto the issues raised by this new technology. The result
is an odd series of overlaps and gaps. For example, the EPA is responsible
for testing and regulating GE plants that endogenously produce pesticides,
like Bt corn, but not those that are modified nutritionally or for increased
herbicide tolerance or disease resistance.43 The USDA has a wider scope in
terms of GE organisms within its regulatory ken, but its focus is exclusively
on whether those novel plants pose a plant pest risk.44 The FDA nominally
regulates food safety but limits its inquiry by beginning with the assumption
that GE foods are substantially equivalent to non-modified versions of the
same food.45 In general, exactly what the FDA regulates with regards to GE
foods is uncertain and confusing.46
A. USDA Regulatory Authority
The USDA-Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) uses the
Plant Protection Act to regulate the introduction of GE crops.47 This statute
40. See Bratspies, Illusion of Care Regulation, supra note 39, at 314 (noting that under FIFRA,
EPA has the primary responsibility of environmental protection from biotechnology).
41. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 390.
42. See Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark, supra note 39, at 473 (describing the FDA’s regulatory
role).
43. Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation, supra note 39, at 316.
44. See Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 391 (discussing the
constraints and conflicts within the USDA’s regulation of genetically modified plants).
45. See Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark, supra note 39, at 487 (explaining the FDA’s
assumptions in the regulatory scheme).
46. Id. at 43 (discussing FDA’s inadequate and unclear regulations of transgenic fish).
47. See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2006) (granting USDA authority to regulate
“any plant, plant product, biological control organism, noxious weed, article, or means of
conveyance . . . that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into the United
States or the dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed within the United States”).
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gives the USDA authority to regulate movement of organisms that may
endanger plant life.48 But, because the Plant Protection Act is a quarantine
statute intended to prevent the introduction and transmission of plant pests,
the USDA’s primary duty is to evaluate whether there is a risk that an
organism will pose a plant pest risk when introduced into the environment,
or interstate commerce.49 Indeed, the USDA touts this evaluation as
evidence that the United States engages in a science-based regulatory
strategy.50
Many GE plants use Agrobacterium, a known plant pest, as the
mechanism for transformation. As a result, these plants fall under the
USDA-APHIS’s Plant Protection Act authority. However, plants
transformed by use of a gene gun do not fall within the agency’s
authority—leaving the introduction of those plants wholly unregulated
unless they happen to fall within the EPA’s narrow regulatory ambit, which
is discussed below. Even for plants transformed by Agrobacterium, and
therefore under the USDA-APHIS’s authority, a plant pest analysis does not
capture many of the most likely risks posed by these crops. The statute’s
implementing regulations defines a plant pest as:
[A]ny living stage . . . of insects, mites, nematodes, slugs, snails,
protozoa, or other invertebrate animals, bacteria, fungi, other
parasitic plants or reproductive parts thereof; viruses; or any
organisms similar to or allied with any of the foregoing . . . [that]
directly or indirectly injure[s] or cause[s] disease or damage to
[a] plant.51

Under section 7711(a) of the Plant Protection Act, the Secretary of
Agriculture may issue regulations “to prevent the introduction of plant pests
into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United
States.”52 The Secretary has delegated this authority to APHIS, which has
drafted regulations to regulate “organisms and products altered or produced
through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant
pests.”53 These regulations give APHIS the authority to regulate GE
organisms and products if the genetic engineering involves use of an
48. Id.
49. Id. at § 7712(c).
50. In its strategic plan, USDA touts the fact that “before a genetically engineered crop can be
commercialized, the Department evaluates it thoroughly to ensure that it does not pose a plant-pest risk.
This process ensures safe introduction and agricultural production options and enhances public and
international confidence in these products.” STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2015, supra note 17, 23.
51. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2012).
52. 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a).
53. 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2), n. 1.
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organism that is considered a plant pest and APHIS has reason to believe
that the GE organism may be a plant pest, or if APHIS does not have
information to determine if the GE organism is unlikely to pose a plant pest
risk. 54
Pursuant to this authority, APHIS regulates “organisms and products
altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are
believed to be plant pests.”55 The statute might authorize APHIS to exercise
broad regulatory authority because it defines plant pest as “any
[microorganism] . . . that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to,
or cause disease in any plant or plant product.”56 The USDA interprets this
authority narrowly, treating GE crops exactly like their conventional
counterparts and evaluating them for the same risks.
GE crops pose many risks for which there is no ready conventional
plant pest parallel. Yet, because it interprets its regulatory authority as
limited solely to plant pest considerations, the USDA-APHIS brackets
many of the clear risks associated with these crops. The bracketed risks
include: the likelihood of excessive herbicide application with the
accompanying evolution of weed resistance;57 contamination of
conventional crops from pollen drift or pollinator activity;58 and the impact
on domestic and global trade that flows from cross-fertilization, crosscontamination, or co-mingling conventional—or organic—and GE crops.59
This latter omission is particularly perverse given that the USDA identifies
“facilitating access to international markets” and “supporting the
development of new domestic markets,” particularly organics, as key tasks
for achieving its self-declared goal of “ensuring a financially sustainable
and competitive national agricultural system.”60
There is no reason for the USDA to limit its consideration of GE crops
in this fashion. The Plant Protection Act gives the USDA broad authority to
regulate “plant pests.” The Act gives the agency even broader authority to
regulate “noxious weeds,” which are defined as “any plant or plant product
that can directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to crops . . . or other
interests of agriculture . . . the natural resources of the United States, the
public health, or the environment.”61

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. §§ 340.0(a)(2); 340.2(a).
Id. § 340.0(a)(2), n. 1.
7 U.S.C. § 7702(14).
See discussion, infra Part III A.
See discussion, infra Part III B.
Id.
STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 17, at 8.
7 U.S.C. § 7702(10).
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Under the Plant Protection Act, the APHIS has the authority to prohibit
or restrict the movement in interstate commerce of any plant in order to
prevent the introduction or dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed.62
Moreover, any plant may “be subject to remedial measures the Secretary
determines to be necessary to prevent the spread of plant pests or noxious
weeds.”63 Because Congress gave the agency broad authority to prevent
noxious weed growth by restricting “any plant,”64 APHIS need not limit
itself to the narrow inquiry of evaluating GE crops for the same harms
associated with traditional noxious weeds.
It should not be surprising that the agronomic and environmental risks
of harm associated with GE crops are novel. There is no reason, other than
internal agency culture, that APHIS does not consider transgenic
contamination of conventional crops or the proliferation of superweeds
from overuse of glyphosate to be issues that “directly or indirectly injure or
cause damage to . . . . agriculture, . . . the natural resources of the United
States, the public health, or the environment.”65
Not only does the agency conceive of its regulatory authority too
narrowly, it also fails to rigorously enforce the regulations it does apply.
Specifically, the Plant Protection Act’s implementing regulations make it
unlawful for any person to introduce without a permit any organism that has
been GE from one or more enumerated organisms that are considered plant
pests.66 Anyone may petition APHIS to deregulate a GE crop.67 Before a
GE crop may be deregulated, APHIS must review an applicant’s
deregulation petition and make a determination that the particular GE crop
does not present a plant pest risk and should not be regulated.68
If APHIS decides that a GE organism poses no greater plant pest risk
than an equivalent non-GE organism, it will approve a petition for nonregulated status. At that point, APHIS claims to have no further regulatory
authority, and the agency ceases to monitor or regulate the environmental
release and movement of the crop.69 This means that deregulated genetically
engineered organisms may be planted anywhere in the United States with
no further regulatory oversight. Two recent lawsuits successfully
challenged the environmental assessments APHIS prepared before deciding

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. §7712(a).
Id. §7712(c)(3).
Id. § 7712(a).
Id. § 7702(10).
7 C.F.R. § 340.2(a).
Id. § 340.6(a).
Id. § 340.6(d)–(e).
Id. § 340.6(e)(1).
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to deregulate two Roundup Ready crops as cursory and wholly
inadequate.70
B. The EPA’s Regulatory Authority
The USDA is not alone in having its hands tied by an unduly narrow
and inadequate statutory mandate. The EPA is probably the most logical
regulator to consider environmental impacts of GE crops. Yet, the agency’s
regulatory authority over these crops is actually extremely limited. Indeed,
the EPA’s regulatory authority over these crops flows wholly from the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which gives the
agency control over a narrow slice of GE crops. Under FIFRA, the EPA
regulates microorganisms, herbicides, and pesticides.71 With few
exceptions, no person may sell or distribute a pesticide that is not registered
under FIFRA.72 Under FIFRA, the EPA “shall register a pesticide if . . . it
will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects to
the environment; and when used in accordance with widespread and
commonly recognized practice, it will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.”73 Unreasonable adverse effects are
defined as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of use
of any pesticide.”74
For GE crops that endogenously produce pesticides, Bt crops, the EPA
has some reasonable regulatory tools available. The EPA has identified the
evolution of resistance to Bt as an adverse environmental impact under
FIFRA.75 To prevent (or delay) this evolution, the EPA imposed planting
restrictions as part of the pesticide registration for Bt crops.76 The goal of
these restrictions is to preserve effectiveness of Bt by maintaining insect

70. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 21, 2009); Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2473 (2010).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a); Id. § 136(t)–(v) (defining pests, pesticides, and plant regulators).
72. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). The pesticide regulations are set out in 40 C.F.R. Parts 150–189.
73. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C)–(c)(5)(D).
74. Id. § 136(bb)(1).
75. OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BIOPESTICIDES REGISTRATION
ACTION DOCUMENT: BACILLUS THURINGIENSIS (BT) PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS IID2 (2001),
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/bt_brad2/4-irm.pdf.
76. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPONSE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO
PETITION FOR RULEMAKING AND COLLATERAL RELIEF CONCERNING THE REGISTRATION AND USE OF
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS EXPRESSING BACILLIUS THURINGIENSIS ENDOTOXINS 8 (2000),
http://www.epa.gov/oppbppd1/biopesticides/pips/greenpeace-petition.pdf.
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vulnerability to the pesticide.77 The cornerstone of this plan was a highdose/structured refuge strategy.78 Under this strategy, every Bt planting
must be accompanied by a refuge zone—a planting of non-Bt crops not
sprayed with Bt foliar spray.79 For this strategy to work, three critical
conditions that must be met: the GE Bt plants’ tissue must be very toxic to
kill all individuals heterozygous for resistance; resistance alleles must be
sufficiently rare that nearly all alleles will be in heterozygotes susceptible to
the very toxic plants; and refuges must be planted to maximize the
probability that any resistant homozygote insect will mate with susceptible
homozygote insect, thus producing heterozygous progeny that cannot
survive the toxicity of the crop.80
This all seems very scientific and at first glance might support industry
contentions that regulation of GE crops is both rigorous and science-based.
Yet, when the EPA first registered Bt crops in 1996, and when it reregistered them in 2001, the agency had no information from which to
conclude that any of these conditions were actually being met.81 Some GE
crops were approved despite not producing a particularly high dose of the
Bt toxins.82 Bt crops were approved without an estimate of resistance allele
frequency and required in-field sampling techniques were inadequate to
catch resistance before it had taken hold.83 Most disturbingly, Bt crops were
approved without a refuge requirement.84 Only when it became graphically
clear that the EPA’s initial planting estimates and assumptions about
voluntary compliance were wrong did the EPA use its regulatory authority
to mandate refuges.85 Even then, the agency imposed a refuge requirement
less stringent than virtually every scientific estimate of adequacy, and the
agency also permitted growers to spray these refuges with pesticides if crop
damage exceeded an economic loss threshold.86 While any or all of these

77. Id. at 9.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation,
supra note 39, at 330–31 (arguing that in light of the available scientific evidence, EPA’s approval of
non-high dose Bt hybrids was unreasonable); see also, Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary
Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL. REV. 593, 615
(2003).
82. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 76, at 9. Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation,
supra note 43, at 329–30.
83. Bratspies, Illusion of Care, supra note 39, at 331–32.
84. Id. at 333–34.
85. Id. at 337.
86. Id. at 339–40.
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regulatory choices may be good policy from a grower-economics
perspective, not one of them is about science.
Moreover, even given the limited rigor of the refuge requirement,
major questions remain about compliance and enforcement. Because the
EPA does not regulate the crop itself, but only the pesticide produced by the
plant, it has no ability to require reporting of where Bt crops are planted.
This lack of relevant authority makes enforcement next to impossible.
Reports suggest that the planting distances are routinely ignored.87
C. The FDA’s Regulatory Authority
The FDA is perhaps the most limited of the three agencies with regard
to GE crops, even though that limitation is wholly self-imposed. The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) prohibits “the
introduction . . . into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”88 A food is “adulterated” if it
bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance.89 Substances that
are added to food fall into two possible categories: food additives and
substances that are “generally recognized as safe” or GRAS.90 The statutory
definition of food additive is “any substance . . . [that] may reasonably be
expected to . . . becom[e] a component or otherwise affect[] the
characteristics of any food” unless the substance is generally recognized as
safe (GRAS) for its intended use by scientific experts.91
Food additives require premarket review and approval by the FDA as
“safe,” which is defined as “reasonable certainty in the minds of competent
scientists that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of
use.”92 If a food additive is deemed unsafe, the food containing the additive
is deemed adulterated.93 Moreover, a food additive is deemed to be unsafe
unless used in conformity with a regulation specifying the conditions under
which the additive may be safely used.94 If the substance added to food,
however, is “generally recognized as safe,” then it is not considered a food
additive for purposes of the FFDCA and no prior FDA approval is
required.95
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 343.
21 U.S.C. § 331(a).
Id. § 342(a)(1).
Id. § 321(s).
Id. § 321(s).
21 C.F.R. §170.30(i).
21 U.S.C. § 331(a), 342(a)(1), 342(a)(2)(C).
Id. § 348(a)(2).
Id. § 321(s); 21 C.F.R. § 170.30.
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The definition of food additive is clearly broad enough to encompass
GE foods. Thus, the FDA might have used its authority to rigorously
regulate GE crops under its food additive authority by requiring premarket
approval of the introduced genetic material they contain and the proteins
that genetic material produces. However, building on the “substantial
equivalence” mindset of the Coordinated Framework, the FDA concluded
that GE crops are presumptively GRAS.96 The consequences of this
decision are monumental—a GRAS determination means that these
products are exempted from the FDA’s food safety regulations. The FDA’s
GRAS presumption for GE foods was upheld in Alliance for Bio-Integrity
v. Shalala.97
FDA regulations do permit those developing GE foods—mostly agbiotech companies like Monsanto—to voluntarily consult with the FDA
before marketing a new GE food product.98 The company’s obligation is to
satisfy itself that its product is safe rather than to prove safety to the FDA.99
This leads to a developer-driven consultation process in which the
proponent of a new GE food decides what safety tests to conduct, and what
data to submit to the FDA. The FDA reviews only the data that is
voluntarily submitted by the company, and imposes no obligation on the
developer to share all its data, including negative or inconclusive results
with the agency.100 The FDA conducts no independent testing of these food
products.101 Thus, the highly touted FDA premarket approval amounts to
the FDA reviewing GRAS determination made by private manufacturers
based on a select subset of supporting data that the manufacturers
voluntarily submit for review.
Not only is there no requirement that GE food developers consult with
the FDA, those companies are also not required to follow any
96. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990
(May 29, 1992).
97. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (D.D.C. Cir. 2000).
98. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, supra note 99, at 22,991. In
2001, FDA proposed regulations that would have changed this regulatory stance significantly. Proposed
Rule: Pre-market Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,706, 4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192 and 592). Under the proposed rules, FDA would have required
submission of data and information about plant-derived bioengineered foods or animal feeds at least 120
days prior to commercial distribution. This mandatory process would have replaced voluntary
consultations, and would have required the agency, not industry to make the GRAS determination in the
first instance. One of the first acts of the incoming George W. Bush administration was to suspend and
withdraw these rules for further consideration. They have never been re-introduced.
99. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE ON CONSULTATION PROCEDURES FOODS DERIVED
NEW
PLANT
VARIETIES,
(1997),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/
FROM
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Biotechnology/ucm096126.htm.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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recommendations that the FDA makes during or after such a consultation.
This consultation process, which the FDA itself characterizes as
“comprehensive scientific review of the data generated by the
developer,”102 culminates merely in an agency statement that it has “no
further questions.”103 This no-action letter is the sum total of the agency’s
involvement—a role rather remote from the industry characterization
suggesting that the agency actually reviews data and makes a decision that
the food is safe.
This is not a recipe for building public confidence. So, perhaps it is no
surprise that the public remains ambivalent about the safety of these
foods,104 and that support for labeling is nearly universal.105 Given the
rhetoric about “science-based regulation” of GE crops and foods, it is
important to highlight just how much of the FDA’s “review” of these
products is actually based on unproven assumptions rather than on actual
scientific data.
Most of the time, food manufacturers have a fairly clear incentive not
to expose the public to known, unacceptable risks—although we have seen
some high profile instances of failure, such as the recent peanut butter
scandal. But, known risks are not the main concern with these novel crops.
This policy creates little incentive for manufacturers to explore possible
risks or to develop the kind of information that would enable a full
assessment of food safety. And, because these food safety decisions are not
made in a participatory, transparent process, the public has no information
about how those private actors assessed the acceptability of any risks they
did uncover. Placing decisions about risk acceptability in the hands of
private actors with a private stake in the decision creates conflicting
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL, 2012 CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF FOOD
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY, 3 (2012),
http://www.foodinsight.org/Content/5438/FINAL%20Executive%20Summary%205-8-12.pdf.
This
industry funded study reported that only 38% of Americans had a favorable or somewhat favorable
impression of biotechnology. This result is consistent with other polling. Thompson Reuters reported in
2010 that 21.4% of Americans believed that genetically-engineered food was safe. THOMPSON
REUTERS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF HEALTHCARE CONSUMERS: GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD (2010),
http://www.factsforhealthcare.com/pressroom/NPR_report_GeneticEngineeredFood.pdf
105. Thompson Reuters reported that 93.1% of Americans supported labeling of genetically
engineered foods. THOMPSON REUTERS, supra note 104. This result contradicted the International Food
Information Council survey which reported that 66% of respondents were satisfied with FDA’s current
regulation of genetically-engineered crops. INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL, supra note
104, at 3. The difference may be accounted for by the fact that in the Food Council survey, only 30% of
respondents were aware that foods produced from biotechnology are currently sold in supermarkets
stores. Id. at 5. In the Thompson Reuters poll, by contrast, 69.2% of respondents knew that geneticallyengineered foods were currently available in supermarkets. THOMPSON REUTERS, supra note 104.
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interests that can work to the public’s disadvantage. It is precisely these risk
acceptability determinations that would benefit most from a public airing of
the risks and benefits associated with a new technology, and the value that
the public puts on risk avoidance in any given situation.
So, when the producers of these crops talk about scientific regulation,
those representations should be taken with a grain or two of salt. Unpacking
the regulatory decisions reveals a tremendous amount of uncertainty, and
extensive policy judgments made in the absence of critical information. To
fill the gaps, agencies have relied on the Coordinated Framework’s
directive to promote this technology as a substitute for missing information.
III. PROBLEMS THAT FLOW FROM OUR REGULATORY POLICY FOR GMOS
In the thirty years since the “Ice-minus” dispute, the United States has
witnessed a dramatic growth in the development and commercialization of
GE organisms. Yet if we look at the questions that still do not fit neatly into
our regulatory process, we find that they are precisely the same issues that
prompted the D.C. Circuit to issue an injunction in 1983—a lack of
attention to systemic environmental risks, or the unintended social and
economic dislocations that accompany this technology.106 Among the
serious concerns that deserve more rigorous attention from regulators are:
the increased use of pesticides associated with GE crops and the emergence
of “superweeds” resistant to pesticides; damage to traditional and organic
farmers; and the lack of transparency and consumer choice associated with
a failure to label GE foods.107 Yet the United States tripartite regulatory
scheme virtually assures that these concerns will continue to fall through
the cracks.
There are some very serious environmental, social, and economic risks
that the existing regulatory regime is systematically unable to address.
Among the most notable of the ignored risks are: (1) the cumulative effects
of multiple GE crops on the evolution of pest resistance due to increased
herbicide use; (2) gene transfer (also called “gene pollution”) to non-GE
plants through cross-pollination; and (3) the “consumer right-to-know” and
“food choice” issues. Indeed, in 2010, the National Academy of Sciences
identified a series of “information gaps on certain environmental, economic,

106. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d in part & vacated in part, 756 F.2d
143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
107. There are certainly other risks, including: potential health risks associated with existing or
likely genetically engineered crops consumed as food; collateral harms to protected species; and an
overall loss of crop biodiversity and industry consolidation.
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and social impacts”108 of these crops that made it difficult, if not impossible
to conduct a full sustainability assessment of GE crops. The next section
examines how the existing regulatory structure exacerbates these problems.
A. Spread of “Superweeds”:
Failure to Consider Cumulative Effects Has Produced Resistance Evolution
in Response to Rapid Increase of Glyphosate Use
Glyphosate-resistant crops109 epitomize many of the greatest regulatory
challenges posed by GE food crops. These crops involve plants genetically
engineered to be resistant to the herbicide glyphosate.110 Planted on 69
million hectares (107.5 million acres) of U.S. farmland in 2011,111 Roundup
Ready crops are the dominant form of commodity crop planted in the
United States.112 In 2012, Roundup Ready plantings constituted 88% of the
corn crop, 94% of the cotton crop, and 93% of the soybean crop.113 In 2011,
Roundup Ready crops constituted 95% of the sugar beet crop.114 This last
statistic is particularly interesting because the crop did not have the
necessary regulatory approvals.115 Indeed the saga of Roundup Ready sugar
beets, and the parallel story of Roundup Ready alfalfa—which was
similarly not approved for planting in 2011—highlights just how broken the
United States regulatory system has become.
One undesirable side effect of widespread adoption of Roundup Ready
crops has been an increasing and often exclusive reliance on glyphosate to
manage weeds. Independent scientists have documented that, contrary to
industry claims, GE crops were responsible for a 383 million pound
108. Nat’l. Acad. of Sciences, Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability
in the United States 3 (2010), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12804.
109. The majority of glyphosate resistant crops have been developed and patented by Monsanto
under the trade name Roundup Ready. However, Bayer, Pioneer and DeKalb also market crops
genetically engineered to be resistant to glyphosate. Jerry M. Green, Evolution of Glyphosate-Resistant
Crop
Technology,
57
WEED
SCIENCE
108,
108–09
(2009),
http://allenpress.com/pdf/wees_57.1_108_117.pdf
110. Id. at 108.
111. CLIVE JAMES, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BRIEF 43: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS, 5 (2011),
available at http,://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/43/executivesummary/default.asp.
112. USDA-ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, RECENT TRENDS IN GE ADOPTION,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_fpra.pdf (last updated July 5, 2012).
113. Id.
114. USDA-ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, BACKGROUND: SUGAR & SWEETENERS,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugar-sweeteners/background.aspx (last updated Oct. 9 2012).
115. Monsanto Company and KWS SAAT AG; Determination of Nonregulated Status of Sugar
Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,693, 42,693
(July 20, 2012) (granting deregulated status in 2012 and allowing adoption of crop).
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increase in herbicide use from 1996–2008.116 The bulk of this increase was
associated with increased glyphosate use on Roundup Ready crops.117
According to the National Academy of Sciences, this overreliance on
glyphosate has reduced the pesticide’s effectiveness as a weed management
tool.118 Indeed, the increase in glyphosate use associated with widespread
adoption of Roundup Ready crops has resulted in a growing epidemic of
glyphosate-resistant weeds.119 Millions of acres are now infested with
glyphosate-resistant horseweed, pigweed, ragweed, and waterhemp—with
many fields harboring two or more resistant weeds.120 Growers report that
glyphosate-resistant weeds significantly increase their costs per acre.121
Unfortunately, since the introduction of glyphosate-resistant crops in 1996,
ten species of Roundup-resistant weeds have been identified across more
than twenty-two states.122 These so-called “superweeds” are also sprouting
up in other countries that have embraced these GE crops.123 Currently, “a
total of 19 weeds have evolved resistance to glyphosate worldwide.”124
These “superweeds,” are not only driving substantial increases in the use of
glyphosate, but also the increased use of more toxic herbicides, including
paraquat and 2,4-D.125 To deal with resistant weeds, farmers are resorting to
more toxic chemicals and more frequent spraying, and also to more intense
116. Charles Benbrook, Impacts of Genetically Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use in the
United States: The First Thirteen Years, THE ORGANIC CENTER CRITICAL ISSUE REPORT i (2009),
http://www.organic-center.org/reportfiles/13Years20091126_ExSumFrontMatter.pdf.
117. Id. at 3. This dramatic increase in herbicide applications vastly exceeded the decreased use
of insecticide attributable to Bt corn and cotton, making the overall chemical footprint of today’s GE
crops decidedly negative. According to USDA data shows that since the introduction of herbicide
tolerant crops in 1996, glyphosate application has increased by 18.2 % on cotton, 9.8% on soybeans and
4.3% on corn. Id. at 4–6.
118. Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in
the United States 3 (2010), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12804.
119. Id.
120. Benbrook, supra note 116, at 4.
121. Id. at 5–6.
122. Michael D.K. Owen, Weed species shifts in glyphosate-resistant crops, 64 PEST
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 377–82 (2008). For perspective, in areas not growing Roundup Ready crops,
only seven weed species have evolved resistance in the nearly forty years that glyphosate has been
commercially available. Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy: Hearing before the
Subcomm. On Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 3
(2010) (statement of Michael D.K. Owen, Ph.D., Professor of Agronomy at Iowa State University),
available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ocga/testimony/t_Herbicide_Resistant_Weeds_in_
GE_Crops.asp.
123. Stephen B. Powles, Evolved Glyphosate-Resistant Weeds Around the World: Lessons to be
Learnt, 64 PEST MGMT. SCI. 360, 362 (2008).
124. Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy, supra note 122. See also
International Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds. WEEDSCIENCE.ORG,
http://www.weedscience.org/Summary/UspeciesMOA.asp?lstMOAID=12 (last visited April 25, 2013)
(describing types of glyphosate-resistant weeds around the world, by species and country).
125. Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy, supra note 122; Benbrook, supra
note 116, at 4.
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tillage of their fields—all actions with negative environmental
consequences.
According to experts, this behavior reflects the fact that growers:
Value the convenience and simplicity of these crops without
appreciating the long-term ecological and economic risks
attributable to the unvaried tactics they used. . . . That behavioral
response might be expected given many farmers’ desire to meet
short-run financial needs and the fact that other growers may not
take similar control actions.126

This phenomenon, known as the “tragedy of the commons,” is welldocumented.127 There is no question that “unless growers collectively adopt
more diverse weed-management practices, individual farmer’s actions will
fail to delay herbicide resistance to glyphosate because the resistant genes
in weeds easily cross farm boundaries.”128 Indeed, it is precisely because
individuals make decisions based on individual and short-term
considerations that environmental regulation is necessary. Regulators,
acting in the public interest, are supposed to put brakes on individual
behaviors that, when viewed in isolation are beneficial to the actor, but
when viewed in context produce socially-undesirable results.
The average citizen may be surprised by the lack of consideration
given to the weed resistance problem in GE plant regulatory oversight. The
risk is an obvious one and its ramifications quite serious. Nevertheless, it
has not been part of the regulatory calculus to date.
For example, in 2005, APHIS granted Monsanto’s petition to
deregulate Roundup Ready alfalfa, a version of alfalfa genetically
engineered to be resistant to Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide.129 In granting
this petition, APHIS concluded that the plant “should not reduce the ability
to control pests and weeds in alfalfa or other crops.”130 That same year,
APHIS also concluded that deregulation of GE sugar beets “should not
reduce the ability to control pests and weeds in sugar beet or other
crops.”131 It was quite remarkable that at a time when reports of the
126. Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy, supra note 122 at 5/7.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. USDA-APHIS, Notice: Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability
Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide
Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Ref. 36,917, 36,918–19 (June 27, 2005).
131. USDA, Monsanto Co. and KWS SAAT AG; Determination of Nonregulated Status for
Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg.13,007,
13,008 (March 17, 2005.)
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evolution of weed resistance to glyphosate were beginning to pour in, the
agency managed to reach this conclusion.132 It did so by bracketing the
question of herbicide use associated with these crops from its plant pest
analysis.133 The Sugar Beet Environmental Assessment specifically
indicated that it “does not address the separate issue of the potential use of
the herbicide glyphosate in conjunction with these plants.”134 Organic and
conventional farmers challenged both decisions in federal court, alleging
that the agency’s decision to deregulate these crops without first conducting
an environmental impact statement (EIS) violated NEPA.135 The farmers
alleged various significant impacts that necessitated an EIS, inter alia, that
widespread, uncontrolled planting of glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa would
increase the likelihood of glyphosate resistant weeds.136
NEPA is an action-forcing statute.137 It instructs federal agencies to
conduct a “coherent and upfront environmental analysis”138 to ensure
informed decision making. Whenever substantial questions are raised as to
whether a project may cause significant environmental degradation, NEPA
requires that an agency conduct an EIS in order to ensure that the agency
“will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is
too late to correct.”139 NEPA requires federal agencies to analyze not only
the direct impacts associated with a proposed action, but also the indirect
and cumulative impacts.140 The statute deliberately casts a wide net—and
defines broadly the environmental impacts to be evaluated. It is therefore
somewhat astonishing that the agency claimed that it could fulfill its NEPA
obligations by evaluating glyphosate-resistant crops without considering the
effect that increased glyphosate use would have on the evolution of weed
resistance.
132. Green, supra note 109, at 108.
133. USDA-APHIS, PLANT PEST RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVEN H7-1 SUGAR BEET 3,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_pea.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
134. USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
MONSANTO CO. AND KWS SAAT AG PETITION 03-323-01P, FOR DETERMINATION OF NON-REGULATED
STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY SUGAR BEET EVENT H7-1 3 (2004), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_pea.pdf.
135. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is “our basic national charter for
protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a). NEPA directs federal agencies to prepare an EIS
before undertaking “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
136. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d,
570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S.Ct. 2473 (2010).
137. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979).
138. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998).
139. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.8(b).
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In a February 2007 decision, the Northern District of California issued
a stinging rebuke of the agency’s “cavalier” treatment of this serious
question in Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns.141 In particular, the court
applied that adjective to APHIS’s explanation for its decision not to require
an EIS, which hinged on the assertion that “weed species often develop
resistance to herbicides.”142 The Geertson Seed Farms court noted that
although “one would expect that some federal agency is considering
whether there is some risk to engineering all of America’s crops to include
the gene that confers resistance to glyphosate,”143 it is not at all clear that
any agency has explored this question, or even considers the question to be
within its regulatory jurisdiction.
The court decried APHIS’s failure to consider the cumulative impacts
of its decision to deregulate glyphosate-resistant GM crops. The court noted
that “[w]hile the deregulation of one crop in and of itself might not pose a
significant risk for the development of glyphosate resistant weeds, when all
the crops are considered cumulatively such a risk may become apparent.”144
Thus, the court found that APHIS had failed to take the “hard look”
required under NEPA.145
After conducting the court ordered EIS, APHIS concluded in 2011 that
Roundup Ready alfalfa “is unlikely to pose a greater plant pest risk than . . .
other unmodified” alfalfa varieties even after acknowledging the risks and
impacts of gene flow, increased herbicide use, threats to endangered
species, and various socioeconomic impacts.146 APHIS’s rationale was that
it had no authority under the Plant Protection Act to regulate herbicide use
associated with glyphosate-tolerant plants, and that the EPA had concluded
“there is no unreasonable environmental risk if the [glyphosate] user
adheres to the labeled directions.”147 Readers should be clear about what
that means. Based on the EPA’s decision to register the pesticide at all,
APHIS concluded that the particular use of glyphosate associated with
141. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *1.
142. Id.; see also, USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: MONSANTO COMPANY AND FORAGE GENETICS INTERNATIONAL PETITION 04110-01P FOR NONREGULATED STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163 6
(2005), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs2/04_11001p_com.pdf (“Some commenters are
concerned that glyphosate use on glyphosate tolerant alfalfa may result in additional glyphosate resistant
weeds. APHIS agrees that this may occur. Weed species have developed resistance to every widely used
herbicide.”).
143. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *11.
144. Id. at *10, *12.
145. Id. at *12.
146. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: MONSANTO
COMPANY AND FORAGE GENETICS INTERNATIONAL PETITION 04-110-01P FOR NONREGULATED STATUS
FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163 6, at v–vii.
147. Id. at vi.
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Roundup Ready alfalfa production will not adversely impact the
environment.148
APHIS’s plant pest evaluation of Roundup Ready sugar beets was even
more flimsy. It did not even address the problem of increased weed
resistance, focusing instead only on the likelihood that the genetically
engineered sugar beet would itself become a weed.149
To be clear, this means that no regulator considers the cumulative
environmental impacts of glyphosate use before glyphosate-resistant crops
are approved for market even though the entire raison d’etre for these
plants is their tolerance to glyphosate. Monsanto markets—and farmers
purchase—these seeds because the fields can be treated with glyphosate.
The fact that these plants will be sprayed with glyphosate is their most
salient characteristic—one that should be front and center in any assessment
of this technology’s environmental impact. It makes no sense to evaluate
the potentials for impacts to the human environment from these crops while
excluding as somehow unrelated glyphosate use in conjunction with these
plants.
This absurd result flows directly from the thirty-year-old choice to
regulate the products of genetic engineering without creating any new laws.
The EPA’s sole regulatory authority is to decide whether to register the
herbicide glyphosate for sale at all.150 While the EPA has authority over
glyphosate, it has no authority to regulate the plantings of glyphosatetolerant crops, or to regulate the actual pesticide use associated with those
crops.151 The USDA-APHIS does have authority over the plants, but
considers the use of glyphosate in conjunction with those plants to be
outside its regulatory authority.152 As a result, glyphosate-tolerant crops
have been deregulated without considering whether growing these crops
will increase or change glyphosate use.153
The evolution of weed resistance from overplanting glyphosateresistant crops is entirely predictable, and thoroughly well-understood.
Indeed, critics have been vocal since the mid-1990s about this risk. Agency
neglect of this obvious and critical environmental issue was perhaps less
148. Id.
149. USDA-APHIS, PLANT RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVENT H7-1 SUGAR BEET, supra note 133, at
8–11.
150. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (describing EPA’s pesticide regulatory authority).
151. See id. (authorizing EPA to approve pesticides for sale).
152. USDA-APHIS, FINAL EIS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALA, supra note 134, at vi.
153. In assessing the likelihood that glyphosate-resistant sugar beets would change cultivation
practices, USDA notes that “[o]ther than the use of glyphosate to control weeds, none of the
management practices currently employed for conventional sugar beet cultivation is expected to
change.” USDA-APHIS, PLANT RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVENT H7-1 SUGAR BEET, supra note 133, at 11.

2013]

Is Anyone Regulating?

947

blameworthy in the early days of GE crops, when regulators were writing
on something of a tabula rasa. However, it is astonishing that even as
“superweeds” resistant to glyphosate continue to proliferate, the regulatory
scheme is unable to catch up. This massive regulatory gap means that a
major and obvious environmental impact of these crops remains
unexamined. There is no question that widespread planting of yet-another
glyphosate crop can only worsen the well-documented and growing
problem of glyphosate-resistant weeds. A regulatory system that cannot, or
will not, analyze the cumulative effects of glyphosate-resistant crops on the
development of glyphosate-resistant weeds in deciding whether to approve
commercialization of these crops defies logic. Whatever other adjectives
might apply to this decision, “scientific” is surely not one of them.
APHIS artificially limits its inquiry to an assessment of whether the GE
plant poses a greater plant pest risk than an equivalent non-GE organism. In
making this assessment, APHIS considers each modified plant in isolation,
rather than for cumulative impacts in conjunction with use of the glyphosate
herbicide that these plants have been engineered to tolerate.154 Concluding
that each such engineered plant, in isolation, poses no greater plant pest risk
than its unmodified counterpart, APHIS has routinely approved petitions for
deregulated status. Once a crop is granted deregulated status it can be
planted anywhere in the country.
B. Social and Economic Impacts of the Technology: Grower Inability to
Grow Organic or Conventional Crops because of Pollen Drift
A second major gap in the regulatory oversight of glyphosate-resistant
crops has been the regulators’ failure to address the problems associated
with pollen drift—specifically the potential for GE crops to contaminate
nearby fields. This concern particularly impacts organic farmers, but is
increasingly a concern in a globalized commodity market because the
United States allows production of many GE varieties not approved for sale
in the European Union, Japan, and other major markets.155 Even though this
impact from GE crops is well documented and obvious, the convoluted
regulatory scheme created by the Coordinated Framework virtually assures
that it goes unconsidered.

154. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d,
570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S.Ct. 2473 (2010).
155. See, e.g., id. (discussing alfalfa farmers concerns of contaminated crops when 75% of U.S.
exported alfalfa is exported to Japan, which does not permit glyphosate tolerant alfalfa).
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In two recent deregulation decisions, the USDA-APHIS took the
position that it was not required to consider this question before approving
glyphosate-resistant crops.156 The agency’s rationale was that NEPA
directed the agency only to consider physical environmental harms and not
social or economic harms flowing from physical environmental impacts.157
Moreover, the USDA-APHIS also interpreted its Plant Protection Act
authority narrowly to avoid treating cross-contamination as an “indirect”
plant pest risk under the Act.158
Two different federal courts rejected this interpretation of the agency’s
regulatory authority.159 The Center for Food Safety court characterized the
USDA-APHIS’s treatment of this issue as “cursory.”160 The Geertson Seed
Farms court found the agency’s analysis to be “wholly inadequate.”161 In
both cases, the USDA-APHIS’s refusal to consider the question of pollen
drift and cross-contamination issue drew sharp judicial rebuke.
Both courts began with the proposition that NEPA directs federal
agencies to prepare an EIS before undertaking “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”162 The courts
noted that “human environment” has been comprehensively interpreted “to
include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people
with that environment.”163 To determine whether NEPA requires an agency
to consider a particular effect, the Supreme Court has directed agencies to
“look at the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical
environment caused by the major federal action at issue.”164 The plaintiffs
in both cases succeeded in persuading federal courts that this capacious
156. Id. at *7; Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009).
157. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *7.
158. Id. at *6 (discussing how APHIS did not determine that no cross-contamination would
occur; rather, it interpreted the responsibility for preventing cross-contamination as belonging to farmers
themselves—that is, even though APHIS did not contemplate how farmers could prevent crosscontamination, farmers are still responsible for preventing their own crops from undergoing
contamination).
159. Id. at *9.
160. Ctr. for Food Safety, 2009 WL 3047227, at *8–9 (noting that APHIS offered the following
“conclusory” statement in the EA:
It is not likely that organic farmers, or other farmers who chose not to plant
transgenic varieties or sell transgenic sugar beets, will be significantly impacted
by the expected commercial use of this product since: (a) non-transgenic sugar
beet will likely still be sold and will be available to those who wish to plant it; (b)
farmers purchasing seed will know this product is transgenic because it will be
marked and labeled as glyphosate tolerant.)
161. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *7.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
163. CEQ Definition of Human Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1978) (emphasis added).
164. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773 (1983).
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definition gave the agency scope to consider and address the desire of
organic and conventional farmers not to have their fields and crops
contaminated with GE pollen.165 By ignoring this question, the USDAAPHIS failed to take the requisite “hard look” at the economic impacts of
its deregulation determination on conventional and organic farmers.166
The courts directed the USDA-APHIS to go back to the drawing board
and to consider whether pollen flows from fields planted with GE crops to
those growing conventional or organic crops was an unacceptable
environmental impact.167 Embedded in this inquiry was an important
subtext: Who should bear the costs and risks associated with avoiding this
impact?168 The Center for Food Safety allegations that wind-blown pollen
from GE sugar beets would contaminate conventional sugar beets and other
closely related crops, such as chard and red table beets placed this question
squarely before the court.169 The Geertson Seed Farms court found that
cross-contamination of seed alfalfa was not only a “realistic potential” but
“especially likely” given the geographic concentration of alfalfa seed
production.170
Conventional and organic growers expressed concern that if Roundup
Ready sugar beets and alfalfa were deregulated, pollen from the GE crops
would contaminate their fields.171 The consequences of this pollen flow172
165. In Geertson Seed Farms, for example, the court concluded that “the economic effects on
the organic and conventional farmers of the government's deregulation decision are interrelated with,
and, indeed, a direct result of, the effect on the physical environment.” Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL
518624, at *8.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *12.
168. Id. at *6 (raising concerns that conventional farmers were being forced to bear the burden
of preventing cross-contamination to their own crops).
169. Complaint for Decl. & Injunctive Relief at ¶ 2 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Conner, No. C 0800484 JSW, 2009 WL 4724033 (N.D. Cal. 2008), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/
Final%20Complaint.pdf. Upon his January 2009 appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack
replaced acting-Secretary Charles Conner as the named defendant.
170. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *5.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Monsanto’s Technology/Stewardship Agreement with its growers shifts all risk of liability
for cross-contamination to the growers themselves. The 2011 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship
Agreement provides, in relevant part:
REMEDY OF THE GROWER AND THE LIMIT OF THE LIABILITY OF
MONSANTO OR ANY SELLER FOR ANY AND ALL LOSSES, INJURY OR
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR HANDLING OF SEED
(INCLUDING CLAIMS BASED IN CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, PRODUCT
LIABILITY, STRICT LIABILITY, TORT, OR OTHERWISE) SHALL BE THE
PRICE PAID BY THE GROWER FOR THE QUANTITY OF THE SEED
INVOLVED OR, AT THE ELECTION OF MONSANTO OR THE SEED
SELLER, THE REPLACEMENT OF THE SEED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
MONSANTO OR ANY SELLER BE LIABLE FOR ANY INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
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would be very serious for those growers—contamination can result in
organic farmers losing their organic status, and can subject conventional or
organic growers to patent-infringement claims if GE crops are found, even
inadvertently, on their land.173 In addition, cross-contamination can disrupt
export markets because many GE crops approved in the United States are
not similarly approved in the European Union, Japan, and other major
markets.174
The deregulation decision was the critical moment to address this issue
of cross-contamination because it was the only moment at which the agency
had the ability to impose isolation distances on the growers of the GE crops.
Once a crop is granted deregulated status, it can be planted anywhere in the
country.175 But, if the USDA-APHIS concluded that the problem of
contamination was a significant one, it could have decided to approve a
partial deregulation that allowed glyphosate resistant crops to be grown
only in certain geographic areas, or under certain conditions, including
isolation distances from conventional or organic crops.176 The deregulation
petition was thus a “now-or-never” moment for considering the question of
cross-contamination. Yet, even after finding that the agency’s sugar beet
2011
Monsanto
Technology/Stewardship
Agreement,
WORDPRESS.COM,
http://thefarmerslife.files.wordpress.com/ 2012/02/scan_doc0004.pdf (capitals in original) (last visited
April 25, 2013).
173. Between 1997–2010, Monsanto filed 144 patent infringement lawsuits against US farmers,
with at least 700 and maybe thousands of cases settled out of court. This issue is of such concern that
growers sought to protect themselves with a pre-emptive suit seeking to enjoin Monsanto from suing
them for patent infringement based on pollen drift. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v.
Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment that
farmers, seed companies, and organizations are not infringing on Monsanto’s patents, that those patents
are unenforceable, and even if they are enforceable, Monsanto is not entitled to remedies against
farmers, seed companies, and organizations). The case was dismissed in February 2012 for lack of
standing and is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit.
174. This concern was particularly acute for alfalfa because 75% of the alfalfa exported from the
United States goes to Japan, and Japan does not permit the import of glyphosate-resistant alfalfa.
Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *2. In its deregulation determination issued after this
litigation, USDA-APHIS acknowledged that “the extent to which GE sensitive domestic and foreign
markets are affected by GT alfalfa deregulation depends on the extent to which gene flow can be
controlled through stewardship programs.” USDA-APHIS, RECORD OF DECISION: GLYPHOSATETOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED STATUS 13 (2011).
Without demanding any showing about the possibility or effectiveness of stewardship programs, USDA
used the possibility of such programs to disregard this clear environmental and social impact from
deregulating a GM crop.
175. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *3.
176. USDA-APHIS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT
ALFALFA EVENTS J-101 AND J-163: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED STATUS 10–16 (2010),
http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/AlfalfaEIS.pdf.; USDA-APHIS,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: H7-1 SUGAR BEET: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED
STATUS
20–32
(May
2012),
available
at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/
sugarbeet_documents.shtml.
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decision violated NEPA,177 the Center for Food Safety court expressed
concern that the agency was still “not taking the process seriously.”178
The USDA-APHIS did not dispute that cross-contamination had
already occurred and might continue to occur. The agency nevertheless
decided to deregulate the glyphosate-tolerant crops despite this problem.179
The USDA-APHIS justified deregulating these crops by concluding that
such cross-contamination did not amount to a significant environmental
impact because it was the organic and conventional farmer who had the
burden of preventing contamination, not the farmer planting glyphosateresistant crops.180 The agency made no inquiry into whether those farmers
who do not want to grow GE alfalfa or GE sugar beets could, in fact,
protect their crops from contamination.181 Instead, in both cases, the USDAAPHIS concluded that the risk of gene transmission was not significant
because “organic production operations must develop and maintain an
organic production system plan that outlines the steps it will take to avoid
cross pollination from neighboring operations.”182
Once again, claims that regulation of these crops is science-based
crumble on closer examination. The agency simply assumed, without
investigation, that farmers intending to grow conventional or organic crops
would be able to cope with the effects of cross-contamination. Indeed, the
agency noted that it would be up to the individual organic or conventional
grower to take measures to assure that their crops will not include any GE
contamination.183 In other words, the agency dodged the question by
placing the responsibility squarely on those who objected to crosscontamination without considering whether it was possible for those actors
to prevent cross-contamination. Whatever else this decision is, it is hardly
an example of evidence-driven, scientific regulation.

177. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 21, 2009).
178. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
179. USDA-APHIS, FINAL EIS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALA, supra note 176, at 10–16;
USDA-APHIS, SUGAR BEET FINAL EIS, supra note 176, at 20,–32.
180. USDA-APHIS, FINAL EIS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALA, supra note 176, at 15.
181. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *6.
182. USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT:
MONSANTO COMPANY AND FORAGE GENETICS INTERNATIONAL PETITION 04-110-01P FOR
NONREGULATED STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163 2 (2005)
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs2/04_11001p_com.pdf; USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT MONSANTO CO. AND KWS SAAT AG PETITION
03-323-01P, FOR DETERMINATION OF NON-REGULATED STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY SUGAR BEET
EVENT H7-1 13 (2004), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_pea.pdf.
183. USDA-APHIS, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA,
supra note 182.
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C. Consumer Disempowerment: Lack of Transparency
In 2003, the European Union adopted regulations establishing a system
to trace and label genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and to regulate
the sale and labeling of food derived from them.184 In 2008, the European
Union reaffirmed the need for labeling thresholds for GMOs in
conventional seeds, emphasizing that the thresholds must be set at the
lowest practicable levels in order to ensure freedom of choice for producers
and consumers.185
In the United States, by contrast, there are no labeling requirements of
any kind for GE foods. This remains the case even though polls consistently
show that the majority of Americans support labeling of GE foods. Indeed,
in a 2010 Thompson Reuters poll, 93% of respondents thought that foods
should be labeled to indicate that they have been genetically engineered or
contain GE ingredients.186 This desire for labels did not necessarily mean
that surveyed consumers wanted to avoid these products—60% expressed a
willingness to eat GE vegetables, fruits, and grains but far fewer, 35–38%,
were willing to eat GE animals.187 The overwhelming support for labeling
must therefore be read as a desire for transparency—a vote in favor of the
Right to Know. For labeling advocates, the issue is “the fundamental right
to know about the food we eat.”188 Without access to key information,
consumers have no means for expressing their preferences in a market
economy. By contrast, Monsanto argues that “[r]equiring labeling for
ingredients that don’t pose a health issue would undermine both our
labeling laws and consumer confidence.”189
Monsanto’s position might have been tenable if the risk assessment
process for these novel foods was a transparent, public process in which
concerned citizens could participate and review a well-developed body of
safety information. However, no such process exists in the United States.
Purveyors of these products make a GRAS determination on their own,
184. Council of the European Union, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): Council
Conclusions, No. 16882/08 of 5 Dec. 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/
st16882.en08.pdf.
185. Council of the European Union, Genetically Modified Organisms – Council Conclusions,
No. 16882/08 of Dec. 2008, http://earthopensource.org/files/pdfs/EU-Commission-draft-GMOregulation/Environment-Council-conclusions-GMO-4-12-08.pdf
186. THOMPSON REUTERS, supra note 104.
187. Id.
188. Bill Maher Show on GMO Labeling Features Just Label It Chair Gary Hirshberg, Article
in Press Room, JUST LABEL IT! (Oct. 19, 2012), http://justlabelit.org/press-room (quoting Just Label It
Chair Gary Hirshberg).
189. What’s the Problem With Labeling Genetically-Modified (GM/GMO) Foods?, MONSANTO
(June 21, 2012), http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/food-labeling.aspx.
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deciding whether the foods are substantially equivalent to non-modified
foods.190 Although these actors may consult with the FDA, they have no
obligation to do so, nor do they have an obligation to present a full and
complete record of all their data—including negative data—to the
agency.191 Moreover, because companies claim that much of the submitted
information amounts to confidential business information under the Trade
Secrets Act, the FDA cannot make much of the information it does receive
available to the public.192
Why should consumers trust such a secretive process? It is a lack of
transparency and perceived lack of democratic legitimacy that drives the
labeling demand. The organization Just Label It has submitted a citizens’
petition signed by more than one million citizens requesting that the FDA
engage in rulemaking to require labeling of GE foods.193 To date, the FDA
has taken no action.
In the absence of federal action on this point, a number of states have
expressed an interest in using state law to require labeling of GE foods.194
Rather than recognizing and meeting a genuine demand for information,
industry has not hesitated to spend liberally to thwart these measures.195
The most recent example of how industry has flexed its muscles to
prevent labeling was California’s Proposition 37. Proposition 37 would
have redefined “misbranded food” to include any food either produced by
genetic engineering or containing an ingredient produced by genetic
engineering unless the food was labeled accordingly.196 The measure would
also have prohibited any food produced with genetic engineering from
being labeled “natural.”197 The “No on 37” campaign had the backing of
large agribusiness and chemical companies.198 The “Yes on 37” campaign

190. See supra Part III A (describing developer driven consultations for genetically modified
foods).
191. Id.
192. EPA also struggles with the trade secrets issue. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, FIFRA
INFORMATION SECURITY MANUAL, http://www.epa.gov/oamhpod1/oppts_grp/0913541/ism.pdf (last
visited Apr. 25, 2013); Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark, supra note 39, at n. 164.
193. Bill Maher Show, supra note 188.
194. Stephanie Strom, Genetic Changes to Food May Get Uniform Labeling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/business/food-companies-meet-to-weigh-federal-labelfor-gene-engineered-ingredients.html?ref=geneticallymodifiedfood&_r=0.
195. Prop. 37: Genetically Engineered Foods, VOTER’S EDGE CALIFORNIA (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://votersedge.org/california/ballot-measures/2012/november/prop-37/funding (totaling industry
spending on opposing Proposition 37 as $46 million).
196. KCET, Proposition 37: Read the Text§ 110809(a), http://www.kcet.org/news/ballotbrief/
elections2012/propositions/prop-37-read-the-text.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
197. Id. § 110809.1.
198. Proposition 37, supra note 196.
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was supported largely by the organic industry, consumer groups, and
alternative medicine organizations.199
The ballot initiative was initially extremely popular, holding a two-toone lead in the polls for much of the election season.200 In the weeks leading
up to the election, the “No on 37” campaign spent $46 million blanketing
the state with “No on 37” ads and mailers.201 By contrast, supporters of the
initiative collected and spent just over $9 million.202 The ballot initiative
was ultimately defeated 51.4% to 48.6%.203 A similar referendum initiative
is on tap in Washington State, while Vermont and Connecticut both
considered legislative measures that would have required similar
labeling.204 Both legislative measures were tabled after Monsanto
threatened lawsuits.205 The industry argument against labeling boils down to
the assertion that despite expressed consumer interest in obtaining this
information, they are not entitled to the information because it is not
relevant. And, the main reason that the information is not relevant is that
these crops are the substantial equivalent of unmodified crops—a decision
made behind closed doors by the very entities opposing the right to know.
In short, consumers have no right to know this information because the
industry has decided that there are no risks.
The industry desire for secrecy extends from consumers to growers.
For many decades prior to genetic engineering, farmers relied on university
agriculture extension scientists to perform tests comparing new and
standard crop varieties.206 But it is increasingly difficult for university
199. Id.
200. Andrew Pollack, After Loss, The Fight to Label Modified Food Continues, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/business/california-bid-to-label-geneticallymodified-crops. Html?_r=odgwh=7CD7AE29C0ECJA4976BEEC4B3615B355.
201. Producers of genetically-engineered crops, and major food processers funded the No on 37
campaign. Monsanto alone contributed over $8 million—17% of the campaign’s total funding. DuPont
contributed more than $5 million. Dow, Kraft, Syngenta, Bayer Cropscience, Pepsico, BASF Plant
Science and the Grocery Manufacturers Association all contributed at least $2 million each. All told, the
top ten contributors, all agribusiness or food manufacturers contributed $25 million dollars to defeat the
initiative. Other large food producers, including Nestle, BumbleBee, Ocean Spray, Unilever
Land’O’Lake, Heinz, CocaCola and Del Monte also made sizeable contributions to defeat the measure.
Prop. 37, VOTERSEGDGE.ORG, http://votersedge.org/california/ballot-measures/2012/november/prop37/funding. Proposition 37, supra note 196.
202. Id.
203. STATE BALLOT MEASURES 69 (2012), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012general/15-ballot-measures.pdf
204. Strom, supra note 194.
205. Anne Sewell, GMO ‘Right to Know’ Campaign in CT fails-Lawsuit threatened, DIGITAL
JOURNAL (May 5, 2012), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/324345.
206. Andrew Pollack, Crop Scientists Say Biotechnology Seed Companies are Thwarting
Research, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/business/20crop.html?_r=0
(describing industry’s chokehold on research).
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scientists to evaluate GE seed varieties because they are prohibited from
doing research on patented GE crops without company permission.207 And
when scientists do receive permission to do research, it is usually with
strings attached that restrict the usefulness of the studies for comparing crop
varieties.208 Indeed, the situation has gotten so bad that, in a public
statement to the EPA, twenty-six eminent entomologists warned that as a
result of industry restrictions on access to GE seeds for research purposes,
“no truly independent research can be legally conducted on many critical
questions regarding the technology, its performance, [and] its management
implications.”209
This chokehold on research gives companies “the potential to launder
the data . . . [and] information that is submitted”210 for agency
consideration. With all information tightly controlled by an industry that
doles out research permission based on perceived favorability of results,
and whether the researcher is “friendly” or “hostile” 211 is it any wonder that
the public is suspicious?
This lack of information is particularly ironic given that the USDA and
the EPA both identify transparency as a core value.212 Yet, in the context of
GE crops, the agencies have not taken steps to promote much transparency.
For example, the EPA could easily require that as a condition for
registration of a Bt plant, the purveyor must agree to give university
scientists unfettered research access to seeds. The USDA could do the same
in its deregulation decisions. In refusing to take these basic transparency
positions, the regulators have aligned themselves with industry in
opposition to any moves toward transparency, including labeling.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States regulatory system for genetically engineered crops is
riddled with major gaps and omissions. Omitted from the regulatory inquiry
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13, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-seed-companies-control-gm-cropresearch (discussing how funding for research on genetically modified seeds is swayed by the seed
industry’s perception of whether a scientist’s research is favorable to their industry).
212. USDA, STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 17, at iv. ; EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2011-2015 STRATEGIC
PLAN: ACHIEVING OUR VISION 1 (2010), http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P1008YOS.PDF.
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are systemic environmental issues213 including the possibility of gene
transfer to non-genetically engineered plants through cross-pollination; the
cumulative effects of multiple genetically engineered crops on the evolution
of pest resistance; and the probability of increased herbicide use. The
neglected environmental, social, and economic issues have contributed to a
profound lack of regulatory transparency in the regulation of genetically
engineered crops, and the resulting erosion of trust in government more
generally.
Nothing shatters public confidence in a regulatory system more than
the sense that obvious public interests and concerns are not being
addressed. The time is ripe to improve the regulation of agricultural
biotechnology. It is past time to consider whether we can establish a
rigorous regulatory process that independently reviews and approves
products that are safe for consumers and the environment. Such a system is
essential if consumers are to have confidence in biotechnology going
forward.

213. Other neglected issues include, the effect of these crops on endangered species, the
possibility of long-term, low-level health effects, epigenetic effects, and the impact that concentrated
control over the food supply has on food security.

